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RECENT BOOKS
BooK CoMMENT

LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE REGULATED
INDUSTRIES: THOUGHTS ON PROFESSIONAL
ROLES INSPIRED BY SOME RECENT
ECONOMIC LITERATURE
Charles Donahue, Jr.*
THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS.
By Alfred E. Kahn. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 1970. 2 Vols.
Pp. xii, 212; xiii, 352. $20.90.
THE CRISIS OF THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS: AN INTRODUCTION
TO A CURRENT IssuE OF PUBLIC POLICY. Edited by Paul W. MacAvoy.
New York: W.W. Norton 8c Co. 1970. Pp. xii, 212. $2.25.
PERFORMANCE UNDER REGULATION. Edited by Harry M. Trebing.
East Lansing: Inst. of Public Utilities, Michigan State University.
1968. Pp. xx, 169. $6.00.
UTILITY REGULATION; NEW DIRECTIONS IN THEORY AND POLICY.
Edited by William G. Shepherd & Thomas G. Gies. New York: Random House. 1966. Pp. xii, 284. $2.95.

I. THE REGULATORY CRISIS AND THE NEW GURU
It is now becoming painfully apparent even to the consuming
public that something is seriously wrong in the traditional regulated
industries.1 The death of intercity rail transportation and the gift
of its corpse to Amtrak, the recurring summer "brown-outs" in New
York City, the difficulty of obtaining a dial tone in the same City,
the chaos in international air fares, and the rationing of natural
gas in many parts of the country are but examples of a larger malaise.
Although the whole economy is currently beset by difficulties, those
of the regulated sector seem considerably greater than those of
the rest of the economy. Nor can the difficulties in that sector be
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan.

LL.B. 1965, Yale University.-Ed.

A.B. 1962, Harvard University;

I would like to thank my colleagues Thomas Kauper, Donald Regan, and Peter
Steiner for stimulating and useful comments and suggestions. Peter Steiner, in particular, l1elped me considerably in sharpening the focus of the piece and in avoiding
both economic and legal errors. Of course, the fuzziness which remains and any surviving errors are solely my responsibility.
·
I. Throughout this review the term "regulated industries" refers to those industties, usually called common carriers or public utilities, which are subject to price
and entry regulation. Included are much of surface and air transportation, leased
communications like telephone and telegraph, and much of the energy industry. Broadcasting, which has its own peculiar problems, is not included, nor are those industries,
like insurance and banking, which, though heavily regulated, do not display "natural
monopoly" characteristics.
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attributed entirely to failures of management, though management
in some portions of the sector has not always been in the finest
American tradition.
There is, in fact, substantial reason to believe that the problems
of the regulated industries are in large measure due to regulation, or,
to put it slightly more broadly, to a failure of public policy with
respect to these industries. Two examples should serve to illustrate.
As early as 1962 Paul MacAvoy predicted that the FPC's policy
toward natural gas field prices (a policy that admittedly was virtually
forced upon it by the Supreme Court) would lead in time to the
necessity of administered rationing of gas. 2 The Court and the
Commission, he argued, had seriously misread the nature of the
market, and prices were being set so low that exploration would be
discouraged, so low in fact that price could not even perform its
traditional automatic rationing function. MacAvoy may now be
accorded the small consolation of an I-told-you-so.3
Similarly, the regulatory process must share some measure of the
blame for the electric power crisis in New York. Various efforts by
the supplier both to reduce air pollution in the City and to expand
its generating capacity have met such regulatory obstacles that the
company is still a major polluter and now has inadequate capacity.
The company's attempt to reduce pollution by firing its boilers with
natural gas was blocked by the FPC and the Supreme Court.4 Its
more recent effort to expand its peak load capacity with a pump
storage facility is still before the courts after what can only be re•
garded as an incredibly tortuous series of proceedings.6 This is not
to say that the company should necessarily have prevailed in these
cases but rather that the regulatory process was incapable of arriving at a timely policy which balanced the power needs of the City
against the known and probable environmental costs of meeting
those needs.
These concerns with both the regulatory process and the regu2. See P. MAcAvoY, PRICE FORMATION IN NATURAL GAS FIELDS (1962), the conclusions
of which are printed in THE CRISIS OF THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 152-68 [herein•
after CRISIS]. See also Kitch, Regulation of the Field Market for Natural Gas by the
Federal Power Commission, 11 J. LAw &: EcoN. 243 (1968), excerpted in CRISIS, supra
at 169-86.
3. MacAvoy, The Regulation-Induced Shortage of Natural Gas, 14 J. LAW &: ECON,
167, 171 (1971).
4. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 21 F.P.C. 138 (1959), afjd., 365 U.S. 1
(1961). The Court upheld the Commission's determination that the use of gas to fire
boilers was an "inferior use" of a "wasting resource" when compared to domestic uses
of gas. 365 U.S. at 8 &: n.5, 22.
5. See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). Upon remand the Commission, after some five years
of proceedings, once more voted to grant Consolidated Edison the license. UnL. L.
REF. ,i 11,152 (Aug. 28, 1970). The case is now before the Second Circuit for a second
appeal, Docket Nos. 35676, 35677, 35678, 35683, 35688, 35689, 2d Cir., 1971.
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lated industries have produced a modest revival of interest among
economists in the problems of the regulated sector of the economy.6
It is a revival which so far lacks a Billy Sunday, but the regulated
industries themselves and some of the foundations have stimulated
it by sponsoring a considerable amount of economic research in the
field. Industry and, strikingly, even the regulatory commissions have
come to employ both consulting and full-time economists.7 The
academic product of this revival is well represented by the major
treatise and three collections of economic essays on regulation which
are listed above.
The field which these economists are re-entering is one that,
despite the obviously economic nature of its substance, has been controlled at the practical level almost entirely by lawyers. 8 True, economists have occasionally served as expert witnesses in major proceedings and have one specialized academic journal devoted in large part
to regulatory matters,9 but lawyers dominate the regulatory decisionmaking process. Industry lawyers prepare the company's case; commission lawyers prepare the Government's. A lawyer in the role of
hearing examiner hears and sifts the evidence and renders an initial
decision, which is reviewed by the commissioners, most of whom are
lawyers. 10 Appeals to the courts are, of course, entirely in lawyers'
hands.
The new presence of economists calls for a reappraisal of the
role of the lawyer in the regulated industries field. The appearance
of a new guru puts the old in an awkward position. Should he grace6. While regulation has always been a specialized subfield of economics, the recent
work has been more in the mainstream than any time since the critical period of
railroad regulation at the tum of the century. For some of the recent literature, see,
e.g., the select bibliography in CRISIS, supra note 2, at 211-12; UTILITY REGULATION:
NEW DIRECfIONS IN THEORY AND POLICY 264-78 [hereinafter DIRECTIONS] and authorities
cited therein; and the select bibliography in 1 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULA·
TION 201·03; 2 A. KAHN, supra, at 331-36. See also Rosoff, Economics and Regulation,
in ABA PUBLIC UTILITY LAw SECTION, 1971 REPORT, at 31-46, and authorities cited
therein. Rosoff's piece came into my hands too late to have any substantial impact on
the text of this review. It contains an examination by an economist working for a
regulated company of some of the same economic developments discussed here. Rosoff's
conclusions on what the role of economists and economics in regulatory proceedings
should be are, in my view, far too modest in the light of the evidence which he
himself brings to bear.
7. Some examples include a substantial Ford Foundation grant to the Brookings
Institution for research in regulation; the publication of a scholarly journal on regulatory problems, BELL J. EcoN. &: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, funded by the American
Telephone &: Telegraph Company, which has also funded numerous university conferences and seminars on the topic; and the establishment in 1962 of an Office of
Economics in the FPC after twenty-seven years of operation without one.
8. See Massei, The Regulatory Process and Public Utility Performance, in PERFORMANCE UNDER REGULATION 113 [hereinafter PERFORMANCE].
9. LAND ECON,
10. See SUBCOMM. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS OF THE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, STATE UTILITY COMMISSIONS, s. Doc. No. 56, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(1967); M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 106 (1955).
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fully retire to contemplate his navel? Should he go out to do battle
with the new? Or should he seek some kind of accommodation? And
if so, what kind? My thesis is that the lawyers who have dominated
the regulatory field must bear the brunt of the blame for the current
regulatory crisis, that the business of the regulatory commissions is
principally economic, not legal, and that professional economists
should play a far greater role in the process than they do now.
To test this thesis I begin by examining the causes of the crisis
as expounded in the current economic literature. This examination
has led me to the conclusion that regulatory practice and policy has
suffered from not being sufficiently economic in its orientation. If
this point is correct, there remains an important subsidiary ques•
tion: "What role, if any, should be played by the lawyer?

II.

WHAT

A.

ARE

THE ECONOMISTS SAYING?

The Need for Regulation

Price and entry regulation is the product of an era in which
economists pretended that actual market structures could be analyzed
as of two forms-competition or monopoly. The former model has
the happy property that under it the economy will achieve an
optimal allocation of resources, a condition in which all resources
· flow to where they are most wanted and all transactions which
benefit both participants have taken place.11 Under monopoly, in
sharp contrast, an optimal resource allocation will not be achieved:
Prices will be too high; production will be too small; and monopolists will earn profits that serve no economic function.
At the time the regulatory commissions were chartered, the legislatures made the fundamental policy choice-a choice which remains unchanged to this day-to achieve or approximate the price
and output results that would emerge from the competitive system.
The principal device chosen to achieve this goal was not regulation
but the antitrust laws, which have as their purpose the restoration to
a competitive state of those sectors of the economy which were
monopolized and the preservation of that state once it is achieved.
Certain industries, however, cannot achieve optimal resource allocation and be competitive at the same time. They display "natural
monopoly" characteristics, declining unit costs over the relevant
range of demand. Price and entry regulation was instituted in these
industries to substitute for the market and to achieve as closely as
possible the allocational advantages of competition. Roughly, entry
regulation is designed to promote the efficiencies inherent in the
natural monopoly characteristics of these industries, while price
11. This condition is frequently called "Pareto-optimality" or "Pareto-efficiency."
For a fuller description, see R, LIPSEY &: P. STEINER, EcoNollncs 344-60 (2d ed. 1969).
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regulation attempts to establish administratively a competitively
low price and thus prevent the inefficiencies attendant upon artificially restricted outputs.12
This theoretical base is simple enough for most lawyers to understand. An entry proceeding becomes one in which the burden is
against a new entrant who might dissipate the efficiencies achievable
by the monopolist. A pricing proceeding is one in which the costs of
a given firm are determined from a combination of accounting,
engineering and economic data, and prices set to equal those costs.
Both proceedings require a balanced judgment about facts derived
from a number of disciplines-the kind of judgment which trial
judges have made with some success in many legal areas.
This legal framework, however, is dependent on the bifurcation
of the economic world into the simple models of competition and
monopoly. The less sure we are that these models are the relevant
analytic representations of reality, the more difficulties there are with
proceeding in this simplified fashion. Over the past forty years
economists have increasingly found these models inadequate. James
Nelson summarizes the consensus among modern economists: "This
simple dichotomy [between competition and monopoly] has been
replaced by a whole family of theoretical market categories, blurring along the edges."13 In the regulated sector especially, economic
developments have been making it increasingly difficult to see the
outlines of the classical monopoly model. For example, the threat
of technological obsolescence, a fate which seems to have overtaken
both intercity passenger rail transport and public message telegraph,
may provide incentives to innovate that, at least in part, substitute
for those provided by competition in the classical competitive model.14 Further, many regulated industries are now confronting
considerably more direct competition than they were in the past.
The transportation industry strikingly illustrates this latter phe12. For an exposition of the basic theory, see I A. KAHN, supra note 6, at 1-19;
Lerner, Conflicting Prindples of Public Utility Price Regulation, 7 J. LAW & EcoN.
61 (1964), in CRISIS, supra note 2, at 18-29, as Conflicting Prindples of Public Utility
Rate Regulation. Of course, as Lerner points out, absent perfect price discrimination,
Pareto-optimality cannot be achieved in a declining cost industry so long as some or
all of the consumers must bear the imbedded costs of the service. For some provocative
suggestions on how to approach this problem, see Baumol, Reasonable Rules for Rate
Regulation: Plausible Policies for an Imperfect World, in PRICES: ISSUES IN THEORY,
PRAcnCE AND PUBLIC POLICY (A. Phillips & o. Williamson ed. 1967), and in CRISIS, supra
note 2, at 187-206. See generally J. NELSON, MARGINAL COST PRICING IN PRACTICE (1964).
13. Nelson, Pricing and Resource Allocation: The Public Utility Sector, in DIRECTIONS, supra note 6, at 59, 84-85.
14. See Adams & Dirlam, Market Structure, Regulation and Dynamic Change, in
PERFORMANCE, supra note 8, at 131. Scherer notes that" ••• an output handicap amounting to 10 per cent of gross national product due to static inefficiency is surmounted
in just five years if the rate of growth of output can be raised through more rapid
technological change from 3 to 5 per cent per annum ••••" F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL
l\fARKET STRUCTURE &: ECON0!IIlC PERFORMANCE 346 (1970).
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nomenon and so, many would argue, does the energy industry, particularly if gas and electric companies are kept separate.1u
These developments raise the question whether regulation today
actually has any effect at all. One study of this question by George
Stigler and Claire Friedland has had such a significant impact in the
economic world that it has been reprinted in two of the recent
collections of economic essays about regulation.16 Using fairly sophisticated econometric techniques, Stigler and Friedland compared both
the revenue and output of various regulated and unregulated electric companies during the teens, twenties, and thirties of this century. They concluded that once inherent cost differences were
controlled for, regulation had little or no "significant" effect on
either the revenue or the output of the companies. The authors suggest that the reason for this result is that there was sufficient competition in the energy industry to keep the performance of the
unregulated companies close to competitive without regulation and
that regulation was sufficiently imprecise to make any significant
difference.
The Stigler-Friedland thesis has been subjected to considerable
scrutiny, and a number of objections have been raised.17 These objections, however, need not detain us here, for despite them, the
Stigler-Friedland position has remained "relatively secure."18 Further, no serious scholar doubts that the question whether regulation has any effect is a fundamental and serious one, and that however
difficult their techniques and debatable their conclusions, Stigler and
Friedland offer a methodology for answering this type of question
which has great promise for fruitful results. Yet, with a few exceptions, the lawyers who dominate the regulatory process have not
come to grips with the challenge which they present.
At first glance, such studies seem to have little relevance to practicing lawyers except perhaps in their occasional role as legislators.
After all, the commissions are there and will continue to be there
15. See Adams &: Dirlam, supra note 14.
16. What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity, 5 J. LAW &: ECON. 1
(1962), in CRISIS, supra note 2, at 39-52, and in DIRECTIONS, supra note 6, at 187-211,
17. For example, if the criteria concerning what constitutes "significant" effect are
relaxed somewhat, the data will bear the inference that regulation has some effect. Sec
F. SCHERER, supra note 14, at 537 n.40; Comanor, Should Natural Monopolies IJe Regulated?, 22 STAN. L. REv. 510, 515-17 (1970). On a broader scale, the Stigler-Friedland
analysis can be criticised because it does not take into account the difference between
active and inactive commissions, nor the threat of regulation in an unregulated jurisdiction. Such intangibles are difficult to measure, but they open the policy conclusions
of the piece to question. Further, even if the analysis is correct, any inference as to the
effect of regulation today requires the further assumption that conditions since the
Second World War are the same as those prior to the War. Stigler and Friedland,
of course, could not make the same kind of comparison with recent data, since in
recent years practically every company in the electric industry has been regulated.
18. CRISIS, supra note 2, at 39.
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until the legislature disestablishes them. This view, however, is
short-sighted. If there is something to the notion that regulatory
commissions need not do some or a large portion of their job because competition is doing it for them in a better and more precise
fashion, then it is incumbent upon the lawyers who practice before
the commissions to make the commissions aware of this fact and upon
the la'wyers who run the commissions to act accordingly. The law, by
and large, does not prescribe how the commissions are to exercise
their jurisdiction.19 There may be many instances in which better
results would be produced if the commissions engaged in what we
might call administrative self-denial20 by allowing market forces to
dictate their decisions about the industries under their jurisdiction.
The FCC's recent opening of the private microwave field to greater
competition is a step in this direction.2 1.
But are la'wyers particularly competent to decide whether to
open portions of the regulated area to more entrants or to allow
market forces to determine certain regulated prices? Such decisions
require empirical judgments about which of a number of competing
economic models is most relevant to the question at hand. These
judgments, in turn, often, if not always, benefit from the use of the
kind of econometric analysis employed in the Stigler-Friedland study.
The analysis is considerably more complicated than the kind of
descriptive statistics which lawyers have traditionally manipulated
in the "Brandeis brief." It is not, to my knowledge, taught at any law
school, and is sufficiently complicated that a lawyer is unlikely to be
able to master it in his spare time. On the other hand, econometrics
is an integral part of the training of most modern economists. This
training is designed to teach not only how to manipulate the formulae which go into the analysis, but how to judge the resultswhether the range of error is too large for comfort and whether the
correlations indicate direct causal relationships or simply indicate
deeper causes.
B.

The Techniques of Regulation

Recent economic literature has done more than raise questions
about the justification of regulation. It has- delved quite deeply into
the problems of over-all profit regulation and pricing of individual
19. For example, the statutory standards governing prices ("All charges ••• shall
be just and reasonable," 47 U.S.C. § 20I(b) (1964)) and entry ("The !FCC] shall have
power to issue such certificate ••. as in its judgment the public convenie_nce may require,"
47 U.S.C. § 214(c) (1964)) in the communications field are so vague ·that regulation
might just as well be left to market forces,
·
: ·
20. The phrase is mine; the idea is developed
Posner, Natural Monopoly and its_
Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REv. 548, 640-43 (1969).
.
21. See 2 A. KAHN, supra note 6, at 132-36, 149-52; 37 TELEcor.WUNICATIONS Rn>.,
June 1, 1971, at I; ·
·

in
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services. As to over-all profit regulation, the regulated firm traditionally is allowed to set its rates so that they will yield revenues equal to
the firm's operating expenses plus depreciation plus a "fair" profit.
This "fair" profit is usually calculated by multiplying a rate of
return times a rate base, which base represents the capital which
the firm has "dedicated to the public service."22 0£ all the items in
this formula none has occupied more time in the courts and commissions than the calculation of the proper rate of return. The
reason for the difficulty is that there is a vaguely defined constitutional minimum below which a court may find the rate "confiscatory."23 Above the minimum the commissions have a great deal of
latitude, but this latitude is always tempered by the regulated firm's
argument that placing the rate too low, even if above the confiscatory
level, will mean that the company will not be able to attract capital
on the open market and service will decline.
The presence of the legal minimum and fears about service decline motivate a commission to set the rate of return on the high
side. Two economists, Harvey Averch and Leland Johnson, on the
other hand, have demonstrated rigorously that a profit-maximizing
firm which receives a greater return on its capital than the cost of
that capital will be motivated to maximize investment in a number of
socially inefficient ways.24 It will, for example, employ capital to do
jobs which could be done by labor at less real cost; it will expand
into new lines of business even though these lines return less than
their marginal cost.
The furor that the Averch-Johnson thesis has caused is somewhat surprising.25 Observers of the regulatory scene have long noticed
that regulated companies have a tendency to "pad the rate base" because they can earn a return only on capital invested in that rate
base.26 Pipeline companies want to build their own pipelines, not
22. Symbolically we may represent this formula as:
RR= OE+ D + %R(OC-D)
where:
RR = total revenue (revenue requirements);
OE = the sum of legitimate operating expenses;
D = accounting depreciation on capital equipment (usually calculated by
straight-line methods);
%R = the percentage rate of return; and
OC - D = the rate base (here to be calculated by the more usual method of
subtracting accrued depreciation from the original accounting cost
of the capital plant and equipment).
Clearly, an accountant's nightmare lurks in this formula. Most regulatory commis•
sions have adopted standardized accounting procedures, but the debates over particular
items are many and furious. See, e.g., 1 A. KAHN, supra note 6, at 25-35.
23. See P. GARFIELD & w. LoVEJOY, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS 117-18 (1964).
24. Averch & Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM.
EcoN, REv. 1052 (1962). See Wellisz, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipeline Companies: An
Economic Analysis, 71 J. PoL. ECON. 30, 39 (1963).
25. See Rosoff, supra note 6, at 34-36, for a review of the literature.
26. Rate base padding is not necessarily a manifestation of the Avcrch-Johnson
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lease space in someone else's. 27 Many electric utilities, without suspicion or complaint, paid highly inflated prices for generators during
the years of the electric equipment conspiracy.28 The battle over
who is to own satellite earth stations can best be understood in these
terms. 29
If the purpose of price and entry regulation is to achieve the
allocative effects of a competitive market,30 then the rate of return
problem fits quite neatly into place. Capital is a resource and, like
all other resources, it has a cost. The commissions have the task, in
the absence of a market, of determining this cost. They have always
been at least dimly aware of the misallocative effects of estimating
that cost too low; Averch and Johnson have simply pointed out the
misallocative effects of estimating it too high.
Granted the importance of precision in this area, 31 one can only
be disturbed at the way the calculation of the cost of capital is currently made. The cost of capital is said to be a matter of judgment;32
in practice this means that its computation is a kind of guessing game
in which a jumble of numbers, including the returns allowed by
other commissions and those earned in vastly different industries,
are thrown before the commission, which then pulls a compromise
figure out of its hat. On the other hand, the economists who specialize
in financial matters have provided working models for such calculations that require the exercise of sophisticated statistical judgment
but have a far firmer grounding in empirical reality than most of
the methods currently used in regulatory proceedings. 33 These
effect. It may be simply tricky accounting, or it may be a manifestation of the phenomenon that "not high profits but a quiet life is the chief reward of monopoly power"
(United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 347 (D. Mass. 1953),
afjd., 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (Wyzanski, J.)), i.e., taking advantage of a monopoly pasition
to be less vigilant about costs. In this latter respect, however, there is no moi:e incentive
to pad the rate base than there is to pad the operating accounts.
27. See Wellisz, supra note 24, at 35-36.
28. See Westfield, Regulation and Conspirac·y, 55 AM. EcoN. R.Ev. 424 (1965).
29. See, e.g., 36 TELECOMMUNICATIONS REP., Aug. 17, 1970, at 2; 36 id., Aug. 3, 1970.
at I.
30. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
31. One recent analysis of the Averch-Johnson thesis shows that under certain
cost conditions the distortive effect is greater the closer the commission sets the rate
of return to the true cost of capital, so long as the return set is not exactly correct.
F. SCHERER, supra note 14, at 533, 551-55. For the sake of the commissions I can only
hope that Scherer's assumptions about the shape of the cost function are incorrect.
32. See, e.g., 1 A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 215-16 (1969),
and authorities cited therein.
33. See, e.g., Miller 8: Modigliani, Some Estimates of the Cost of Capital to the
Electric Utility Industry, 56 AM. EcoN. R.Ev. 333 (1966); Robichek, McDonald 8: Hig•
gins, Some Estimates of the Cost of Capital to the Electric Utility Industry, 1954-57:
Comment, 57 AM ECON. R.Ev. 1278 (1967); Robichek 8: Myers, Valuation of the Firm:
Effects of Uncertainty in a Market Context, 21 J. FINANCE 215 (1966); Solomon 8: Laya,
Measuring Comf1a11y Profitability: Some Systematic Errors in the Accounting Rate of
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models are based on the premise that the investor is not buying
a piece of equipment when he buys stock in a company, but that
he is buying a stream of benefits, some combination of dividends
and growth anticipated over a period of years, discounted to present
value and adjusted for risk, inflation, etc. Thus, the traditional rate
base calculated on the basis of the book value of capital equipment,
or on the basis of the reproduction cost of that equipment, is an
arbitrary place to begin calculating the investor's expected return
and hence the company's cost of capital.
A discounted fl.ow-of-benefits method of calculating the cost of
capital has been presented in at least one major commission proceeding.34 The Commission's opinion solidly summarized the testimony
concerning the model both pro and con, described it as a "new and
challenging approach" with "promise of being a useful tool,'' 35 and
rejected its application with the following language:
We have not had the opportunity to analyze, evaluate, and test
fully his model to determine all of its implications in so far as
fixing an overall rate of return is concerned. However, we believe
that it merits further attention as a means of making available
more objective data and substantive support for the exercise of the
subjective judgments in fixing a rate of return. We would, therefore, encourage further study and refinement of the model to make it
more useful in resolving the special problems which arise in the field
of regulated entities.36
Without in any way disparaging the Commission's efforts, its reaction was predictable, granted the training of the bulk of its members
and staff. Unless the Commission went through a retraining process
or turned over the decision-making function entirely to its experts,
it is hard to see how such an analysis would ever be "useful" to it.31
In the pricing of individual services, the same pattern prevails as
Return, in FINANCIAL RE.sEARCH AND MANAGEMENT DECISIONS 152 (A. Robichek ed.
1967). See also I A. KAHN, supra note 6, at 42-57.

34. In re American Tel. & Tel. Co., 9 F.C.C.2d 30, 70 P.U.R.3d 129 (1967).
35. 9 F.C.C.2d at 66-68, 70 P.U.R.3d at 173-76.
36. 9 F.C.C.2d at 87, 70 P.U.R.3d at 195. See Nelson, Econometrics and Applied
Economic Analysis in Regulatory Decisions, 34 L. & CoNTEMP. PROD. 330, 333.34 (1969),
37~ For the sad story of other such efforts, see Rosoff, supra note 6, at 39•43. Typical
of the judicial reaction is the following from the Tenth Circuit:
From the information so obtained the parties, the staff, and the Commission may
make many computations and reach many results. The assumptions, allocations,
formulae, equations, averages, means, and massive calculations may intrigue a
mathematician or statistician but they have no attraction for us. We respectfully,
decline to be drawn into such a turmoil of numbers.••• We leave to the ex•
perts the selection of source material and the calculations to be made therefrom,
Our concern is with the result.
Skelly Oil Co. v. FPC, 375 F.2d 6, 24 (10th Cir. 1967). How the court was to evaluate
the result without understanding the process through which it was achieved is never
made clear.
·
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in the setting of over-all revenues: economics has made •significant
contributions in theory, factual analysis, and practical policy suggestions, but the commissions have largely ignored these contributions.88 Two interconnected problems predominate here-pricing
services which contribute to the firm's peak load and pricing services
which, because of the weakness of demand for them or the ease of
substitution of competing services, cannot be sold at a price equal
to average total cost. One example of each problem should suffice.
In the Atlantic Seaboard case,39 the FPC decided that off-peak
customers of a gas pipeline should bear twenty-five per cent of the
cost of the capacity of the pipe on the rationale that no one should
get a free ride on the line. The principle of the decision is economically unimpeachable if it is restated: absent compelling social reasons
to the contrary, no user should pay the costs for another's service.
But what are the costs of taking a passenger to Chicago if the train
is going there anyway, and if that passenger can b_e bumped off in
Dubuque should enough full-fare passengers come on . to fill the
train? Arguing that this was the situation in the Atlantic Seabord
case, many economists have charged that the rule of the decision
resulted in the loss of off-peak business to the pipelines and thus in
higher prices for the remaining users.40
A careful reading of the Seaboard opinion, however, reveals that
the Commission was struggling with a more complex problem than
that of the train through Dubuque. The Seaboard case was a certification (entry) case; the question at issue was not how to fill the pipe
once it is built, but rather whether to build it at all, and, if so, how
large to build it. There is some indication that an off-peak -price
which did not contribute to capacity costs would have stimulated
demand sufficiently to exceed the capacity of the pipe. If this is so, the
Commission was dealing not with the relatively simple "firm peak"
problem presented by the train through Dubuque but with the theoretically much more difficult "shifting peak" problem, a problem that
despite its analytic difficulty does have a logical solution.41 Lacking
the economic sophistication to perceive the nature of the problem., the.
Commission and the fawyers involved in the decision ended up with
a rigid rule-of-thumb,-~vhich possibly ha~ serious misallocative effects.
38. Indeed, the commissions frequently ignore the pricing of individual services
entirely, leaving the job to utility management. See 1 A. KAHN, supra note 6, at 54-57;
Troxel, Telephone Regulation in Michigan, in DIREcnoNs, supra note 6, at 141,
175•85.
. I
39. In re Atlantic Seaboard Corp., 11 F.P.C. 43, 94 P.U.R. 235 (1952) ..
40. See P. GARFIELD&: W. LOVEJOY, supra note 23, at 184-85; Herz, Impact of Cost
Allocation on Gas Pricing, 58 PUB. Ura.. FoRT..-685" (1956); Nisse!, The Impact of Cost
Allocations upon Future of the Natural
Indus'try, 66 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 512 (1-960).,
41. See Steiner, Peak Loads and Efficient Pricing, 71 Q.J. ECON. 585 (1957). For a
review of the subsequent literature, see Steiner, Peak Load Pricing Revisited (mimeo
ed.) (to be published in MSU Punuc UTILITY STUDIES (Trebing ed. 1971)).
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The ICC's minimum price regulation of bulk commodity rail rates
in cases where alternative water routes exist illustrates the problem
of pricing competing services and its relationship to the peak load
problem. In a situation in which pricing the rail service at less than
fully allocated but not more than "out-of-pocket" (or marginal) 42
cost would result in the barge lines losing business, the ICC forbade
the rail carrier from undercutting the barge prices.43 Its justification
was that the barges would go out of business, whereupon the railroads would raise prices again, and thus the other users of the railroad would be subsidizing this "destructive competition." The
argument will not withstand careful analysis. It ignores the extreme unlikelihood that granted today's discount rates and the ease
of entry into and exit from the barge business, destructive competition could be profitable. It also ignores the fact that under conditions of declining unit cost any contribution to the fixed cost
of a service made by a customer who has an alternative source of
supply benefits the customer who does not have that source.
The problem of the pricing of individual services in the transportation industry has been subject to a considerable amount of
quantitative analysis. On the basis of an extensive examination of the
costs of various modes of surface transportation, one informed economist estimates the cost to the economy of the misallocations resulting
from decisions like the ICC's rail-barge case at several billion dollars
annually.44 Another, examining the trucking industry alone, estimates an annual loss of from 375 to 500 million dollars through misallocations resulting from artificially high common carrier truck
rates.45 While the other regulated industries have not been subjected
to as much similar scrutiny,40 there is no reason why they could not
be. Again, as in the other areas we have examined, there are difficulties with obtaining the proper data, but as one economist has
trenchantly put it:
42. Marginal costs are the economically relevant ones, but "out-of-pocket" costs arc
as close as the ICC can come to calculating them. See Wilson, TIie Effect of Rate Regu•
lation on Resource Allocation in Transportation, 54 AM. EcoN, REv. 160, 161-63 &:
n.2 (Papers&: Proceedings) (1964), in CRISIS, supra note 2, at 57, 58-61 &: n.2.
43. Ingot Molds, Pa. to Steelton, Ky., 326 I.C.C. 77 (1965), revd. sub 110,n, Louisville
&: N.R.R._v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 71 (W.D. Ky. 1967), reud. sub 110,n, American
Commerci;il, Lines, Inc. v Louisville &: N.R.R., 392 U.S. 571 (1968), noted in 81 HARV, L.
REv. 905 (1968), criticized in 1 A. KAHN, supra note 6, at 160-66. See Rose, Regulation
of ltitermodel Rate Competition in Transportation, 69 MICH, L. REv. 1011 (1971).
44. Peck, Competitive Policy for Transportation, in CRISIS, supra note 2, at 72, N,
based on J. MEYER, M. PECK, J. STENASON &: C. ZWICK, THE ECONOMICS OF COMPE•
TITION IN THE TRANSPORTAnoN INDUSTRY (1959).
45. W, Oi &: A. HURTER, ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE TRUCK TRANSPORTATION ll5!1 (1965),
See M. BURNSTEIN, et al., THE COST OF TRUCKING: ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS (1965).
46. But cf. Littlecbild, Peak-load Pricing of Telephone Calls, l BELL J. EcoN, &:
MANAGEMENT ScIENCE 191 (1970).
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The fact that the elasticity of demand is difficult to estimate does
not make it more sensible to assume that demand has no elasticity
at all. The anxiety to avoid burdening certain customers by charging
others less than fully distributed costs does not justify burdening
them even more by refusing a utility permission to reach out for
additional business, when a discriminatory rate is necessary to get it
and where it seems reasonably probable that it will cover its full
additional costs. The fact that off-peak consumption at certain times
of the day or year is close enough to the peak to make it reasonably
probable that the peak might shift is no excuse for forcing customers
also to bear capacity costs at times that are unlikely to become peaks.
The fact that future costs are difficult to estimate does not make it
rational to cling to past costs, when there is clear reason to believe
they are ·wrong. The use of correct principles is still far from solving
all the problems of intelligent public utility pricing; but it is the
correct place to begin.47
Economic thinking in the regulated industry area has not confined itself to the problems discussed above. Serious efforts have
been made, for example, to measure the performance of various
firms within an industry.48 These studies have, to my knowedge,
been ignored in regulatory practice. Since the evaluation of the performance of a regulated company is one of the most troublesome of
regulatory problems, one can only speculate that the techniques used
in these studies simply could not be comprehended by the regulators.
Similarly, the Office of Economics of the FPC attempted to construct
a model of natural gas needs and the relationship of these needs to
price.49 While there were analytic problems with this model, had the
Commission refined and used it, the natural gas crisis of today
might have been avoided.
The picture I have painted above is clearer than reality. Economists are by no means unanimous in their prescriptions for the regulated industries. Nonetheless, the basic views of economists of a wide
range of political persuasion are as I have outlined: Regulation, in
many instances, is unnecessary and, as currently practiced, is inept;
the regulatory "crisis," in large measure, is a product of these
characteristics. 60
47. I A. KAHN, supra note 6, at 199.
48. See, e.g., w. IULO, ELECTRIC UTILmES-Cosrs AND PERFORMANCE (1961); J. Pace,
Relative Efficiency in the Electric Utility Industry, 1970 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation
in University of Michigan Graduate Library). See generally PERFORMANCE, supra note 8.
49. See Rosoff, supra note 6, at 41-43.
50. MacAvoy, after rehearsing the findings of economic research which "lead to
the very general conclusion that regulation has imposed considerable costs on public
utility company operations without providing compensating benefits," puts it this
way: "[I'Jhe crisis is not in regulation, but rather of the need for regulation as it now
exists, in comparison with totally new techniques or no regulation at all." CrusIS, supra
note 2, at viii (emphasis original),
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MEANWHILE, BACK AT THE BAR

My thesis, as I intimated. earlier, is that these criticisms should
lead us to re-evaluate the role of lawyers in the regulatory field. The
very fact that there is a crisis in the field, caused, so far as we can
tell, by regulation, means that the professional group responsible for
regulation should be called to account. Our review of what the economists are saying has indicated a number of situations in which the
regulators have ignored economic contributions because of their
seeming inability to understand them. This is disturbing. The regulators should at least be able to understand the advice being offered
by a group which has devoted considerable attention to the resolution of the problems which have caused the crisis. My thesis, however,
goes beyond the proposition that lawyers should abandon regulation
because they do not understand economics. My thesis is that lawyers
are peculiarly unsuited to making the types of decisions which are at
stake in price and entry regulation.
Since this proposition may seem startling to many-particularly
to the practitioners in the regulated industry field-it calls for
some initial clarification. While the substance of law and economics
may overlap, they remain, and are likely to remain for the near
future, two separate disciplines. In a world in which training had
no costs, we would recommend that the regulatory process be in the
hands of persons who had complete professional training in both
fields. But despite the recent availability of various joint degree programs,61 persons trained in both law and economics remain rare even
in the academic world. Granted the necessity of choosing between
legally and economically trained regulators, economics training is a
better preparation, in my view, for a career in regulation than is
legal training. This does not mean that all economists would make
better regulatory decisions than all lawyers. There are many
economic considerations which a good lawyer will see and a bad
economist will not. But lawyers, however much they may like to
think so, do not have a monopoly on brains.62 Given an equally bright
lawyer and economist, the former will usually be a better lawyer and
the latter a better economist.
Granted these qualifications, two characteristics of price and
entry regulation lead to the conclusion that the job would be better
done by those with economic rather than legal training, The first
is the econometric nature of the information needed to make proper
regulatory decisions. Not coincidentally ea.ch .of the economic criti· 51. Programs combining law and economic training are available at the Universities of Michigan and Chicago and at ·Northw"estern University, to name but a
few known to the author.
52. See P. COMESTOR, DE CRANIIS ADVOCATORUM ET PHILOSOPHORUM SOCIALIUI\I (1516),
for the first recorded instance of this observation.
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cisms of the regulatory process which we examined above leads to a
body of econometric research which offers a method for arriving at a
more satisfactory answer to the problem. Not all of this research is
of a uniformly high quality, and most of it needs substantial refinement. But these problems do not change the conclusion that refined
econometric data will give us, in time, better regulatory decisions.
That these data have not, by and large, been forthcoming is not
only the product of the ignorance of the lawyers who control the administrative process; it is also a product of the legal nature of the
process itself. Adversary proceedings are not conducive to the discovery of scientific data. Discovery to the lawyer is the ferreting out
of human facts concealed beneath the surface of the proceedingfinding out what the parties really did or what they really intended.
Discovery in the econometric world, on the other hand, consists in
trying to unravel something which no human yet knows. The adversary process has proved highly successful for the former type of
discovery, not nearly so for the latter. 53
Suppose, however, that we trained a new breed of lawyers who
could deal with econometric data. Suppose, too, that the regulatory
agencies could engage in a substantial research program which would
produce the needed data, and that administrative procedure could
be reformed in such a way that these data could be placed before the
commission in an acceptable form. Even under these assumptions,
the current domination by lawyers of regulatory proceedings is unjustified because of the second peculiar characteristic of price and
entry regulation. Earlier I asserted that the sole function of price and
entry regulation is to compensate for market failure-to perform the
allocative function of the competitive market in a situation in which
that market could not operate. 54 If this assertion is correct, it means
that the only goal of regulation is the optimal allocation of resources.
This goal differs from that of most legal endeavors. Here only a
single value is at stake, while many if not most legal endeavors involve a trade-off between or among several values. It means, too,
that the goal of regulation is purely economic. This fact, coupled
with the econometric nature of the information necessary to achieve
this goal, makes a powerful argument for the proposition that the
economist not the lawyer should be the chief participant in regulatory decisions. To the extent, however, that regulation is seeking
53. In the interests of space I cannot explore the implications of this statement for
administrative procedure. See pt. III. B. infra; Gies, The Need· for New Concepts in
Public Utility Regulation, in DIRECTIONS, supra note 6, at 88, 107-11; Nelson, supra
note 36, at 337-38. For a fascinating study of the use and misuse of mathematical proof
in traditional trial proceedings, see Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual
in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1329, 1332-'78 (1971). See also Lozowick, Steiner
&: Miller, Law and Quantitative Multivariate Analysis: An Encounter, 66 MICH. L. REv.
1641 (1968).
54. See text accompanying note 12 supra,
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noneconomic goals in addition to economic 6nes or even to the
extent that it is seeking a number of inconsistent economic goals, the
argument for legal control is strengthened, since lawyers have traditionally participated in public decisions which require the application of a number of disciplines or the analysis of the trade-offs among
goals.
A.

The Univocal Goal of Regulation

The proposition that the sole goal of price and entry regulation
is the approximation of the allocational efficiency of the competitive
market has not been totally accepted even by economists.lili We will
therefore examine, in turn, four possible goals of regulation other
than allocational efficiency: (I) the historic goal of "equity,'' (2) the
"economically irrelevant" goals of certification proceedings, (3) the
goal of service standards proceedings, and (4) possible nonallocational
economic goals.
Certainly considerations broader than allocational efficiency were
thought to be appropriate for price and entry regulation in the past.
Some of the legislators who voted for the adoption of price and entry
regulation at the time of the Granger and Populist movements looked
to regulation not only as a means of achieving efficiency but also as
a means of achieving equity for their constituents.li 6 They hoped that
regulation would effect a redistribution of income between the regulated firm and its customers. As the years have gone by, however, the
conscious pursuit of that goal, despite occasional protestations to
the contrary,57 has been abandoned by regulation. More efficient instruments of redistributive policy, such as social insurance, progressive income taxation, and welfare programs, have taken over the
function of redistribution in our society. The occasional regulatory
efforts in this direction are haphazard, usually misguided, and of
insufficient scale to justify a conclusion that the goal of regulation
today is any other than allocative efficiency. 58
The vocabulary, however, of the days in which the pursuit of
redistributive equity was a major regulatory goal remains in regulatory decisions and masks-to the confusion sometimes of the regulators themselves-what upon examination tum out to be economic
considerations. Rate of return provides an example. The economist
talks of the cost of capital; the lawyer, of the fair return. The econ55. See, e.g., 1 A. KAHN, supra note 6, at 182-99; Rosoff, supra note 6, at 45•46.
56. See w. JONES, REGULATED INDUSTRIES 38-43 (1967).
57. See, e.g., the statement of Commissioner Webb of the ICC in Wilson, supra
note 42, at 164, in CRISIS, supra note 2, at 57, 62·63.
58. See I A. KAHN, supra note 6, at 190-92. But see Posner, Taxation by Regulation,
2 BELL J. EcoN. &: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 22 (1971), for an interesting, if heretical view,

with illustrations from the communications industry.
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omist focuses on what is needed to attract new capital to a firm.
The lawyer sometimes talks as if the firm were in need of a reward
because it has "dedicated its property to public use," or, in somewhat
more sophisticated terms, he refers to a "balancing of consumer and
investor interests." Both of the la·wyer's notions can lead to peculiar
results. The reward notion leads to "fair value" rate base calculation
long since abandoned as a federal constitutional requirement, 59 and
the balancing notion implies that somehow a basic weighing of
values is involved.
The fact is that when the misleading verbiage is cleared away
both lawyers and economists are talking about the same thing. Much
confusion has arisen from the failure to identify two arguably different perspectives: the cost of new capital to the firm, what we might
call the incremental cost of capital; and that return ~which is necessary to keep the investor who already holds stock in the firm from
selling it. The two are, of course, connected. In the short run it
makes no difference to the firm if the investors sell or not. The firm
has the capital, and the investor will bear any loss. But since the
treatment of the old investor will affect the new, the return to existing investors makes a great deal of difference in the long run if the
firm intends to attract new capital. Emphasis on fairness to the existing investor, however, without consideration of the reason for it,
can lead in a declining industry or deflationary economy to rates
of return that are too high; in a growing industry or inflationary
economy to rates that are too low. 60
Economists and economically oriented ·writers frequently charge
that much of what the commissions do, particularly in certification
proceedings, is "economically irrelevant."61 If the charge were true,
the presence of such economic irrelevancies might indicate that the
goal of the proceedings is not an economic one. Closer examination,
however, reveals that the charge is frequently exaggerated and where
it is true, it is not a criticism of the commissions for seeking a noneconomic goal but rather for using inappropriate means to reach
an economic goal.
Roger Cramton, for example, charges that much of what the
commissions do constitutes economically irrelevant "tribal rites.'' 62
He illustrates his thesis by arguing that once the CAB has decided
59. Compare Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898), with FPC v. Hope Natural Gas
320 U.S. 591 (1944).
60. See Leventhal, Vitality of the Comparable Earnings Standard for Regulation of
Utilities in a Growth Economy, 74 YALE L.J. 989 (1965).
·
61. See PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTIVITY & Co:a.rPETITION, REPORT § IB (1969),
ins. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON, FEDERAL A.NrITRusr LAws 207-08 (Supp. 1970) (hereinafter STIGLER TASK FORCE REPORT); Lewis, Emphasis and Misemphasis in Regulatory
Policy, in DIRECTIONS, supra note 6, at 213, 247.
62. Cramton, The Effectiveness of Economic Regulation-A Legal View, 54 A11r.
Co.,
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that there are to be three carriers on the Washington-to-Florida
route, it is economically irrelevant whether the third carrier is
Braniff or Delta. The unstated premise of his argument is that once
the structure of an industry is determined, economic behavior and
performance follow inevitably. Even if this premise were true, structure involves more than simply the number of firms in a given
market. Surely the service which Braniff, as opposed to Delta, might
provide may be dictated not only by the number of competitors in
the market but also by the configuration of their routes-a consideration which occupies a great portion of the CAB's certification
proceedings. If Braniff has to fly empty equipment from Texas in
order to provide service on the Washington-Florida route, it will
need a higher volume of traffic to support that service than will
Delta, if Delta already has equipment on line in Florida that could
be used to provide the service.
A more fundamental problem with Cramton's argument, how•
ever, is his premise that there are inexorable links between economic
structure, behavior, and performance. Links, of course, there are,
but it is the loose linkage of a chain, not the firm linkage of a
tie-rod. Surely it will make some difference who the managements of
the firms are, whether they have followed an active competitive
policy, how good their credit rating is, how good their pilots are,
and a myriad of other factors frequently considered in certification
proceedings. Surely, too, it will make a difference to service in other
areas, if not to the Washington-Florida service, if the firm awarded
the route is compelled by the CAB to use the revenues from that
route to subsidize traffic in other areas.
Thus, Cramton is not arguing that the goal of CAB certification
proceedings is noneconomic, nor even that the criteria which the
CAB applies are noneconomic. Rather, he seems to be arguing that
the CAB should rely more on market forces to determine the structure of the airline industry-a proposition for which there is considerable support in economic literature.63 Further, Cramton may also be
arguing that the CAB had to undertake the difficult, if not impossible, job of predicting which firm will provide efficiently the service
which consumers want, because it has chosen to insulate airlines from
the very market forces which if allowed to operate would compel
efficient economic performance. Finally, he certainly is suggesting
that the Commission's lack of economic expertise leads it to consume vast amounts of time on individual certification proceedings
EcoN. REv. 182 (Papers &: Proceedings) (1964), in DIRECTIONS, supra note 6, at 249, 251,
Cramton's argument goes beyond the traditional regulated industries as we have
defined them (see note 1 supra). His examples from broadcasting regulation are telling
.and do not require the qualifications suggested in the text for· his CAB example,

63. See Caves, Performance, Structure and the Goals of Civil Aeronautics Board
Regulatio•n, in· Crus1s, supra note 2, at 131.
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which produce little in the way of perceivable ·economic results. All
of these contentions assume that the goal of these proceedings is
economic and attack the manner in which that goal is being achieved.
Most of the charges of "economic irrelevance" seem to reduce to
one or another of the contentions I attribute to Cramton.
There are certainly some certification proceedings, however, where
noneconomic values seem to be at stake. In the Storm King case64
the Second Circuit forced a reluctant FPC to consider the conservation and aesthetic aspects of granting to Consolidated Edison of New
York a license to build a pump storage plant on Storm King Mountain. Numerous state regulatory commissions have had to consider
the propriety of compelling regulated firms to bury utility lines and
pipes. 66 Although these situations seem to involve noneconomic considerations, they can be examined in economic terms. They involve
a classic type of market failure-the social costs of the activity are
greater than the private costs to the actor. Further, an efficient solution to the problem may be approximated through the use of a
quantifiable model, the cost-benefit analysis. 66
Thus, economic learning has some relevance to such decisions.
Cost is surely relevant. Since few would maintain that Storm
King Mountain has infinite value, the cost of saving it should
be determined. But once the economist has determined how
much saving Storm King will cost, he is probably no better equipped
than the lawyer to determine whether Storm King is worth these
costs. We cannot argue, therefore, that this type of proceeding
should necessarily be entirely in the hands of the economists.
The service standards problem is another area in which economics, though relevant, is probably not controlling, both because the
area presents a problem for which, to my knowledge, economic theory
has devised no solution and because the economic data from which a
solution might be approximated are difficult to determine. The problem is caused by the fact that many regulated industries are constrained by their technologies to serve all consumers from a common
plant. This means, in many instances, that they provide only one of
the many possible levels of service. Some consumers would indubita64. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
65. Compare In re Rules for the Undergrounding of Elec. &: Communication Serv.
Facilities, 78 P.U.R.3d 189 (Ark. Pub. Serv. Commn. 1969); In re Georgia Power Co., 76
P.U.R.3d 38 (Ga. Pub. Serv. Commn. 1968); In re Rules for Undergrounding of Elec. &:
Communications Facilities, 74 P.U.R.3d 242 (Md. Pub. Serv. Commn. 1968), with
Gimbel v. Loughlin, 28 Conn. Supp. 72, 250 A.2d 329 (1968); In re United Ilium.
Co., 71 P.U.R.3d 257 (Conn. Pub. Util. Commn. 1967). See generally Aesthetics and
Utility Line Construction, 84 PUB. UTIL. FORT., July 31, 1969, at 49.
66. See generally J. SAX, WATER I.Aw, PLANNING AND POLICY 29-43 (1968); Fox &:
Herfindahl, Attainment of Efficiency in Satisfying Demands for Water Resources, 54 Al,r,
EcoN. REY. 198, 201-05 (Papers &: Proceedings) (1964).
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bly prefer better service at greater cost; others would prefer a lower
level of service at less cost. In some industries, both groups may be
satisfied if the firm can offer various levels of service from the common plant. Thus, it is possible to obtain slow rail freight service at
low rates and fast freight service at higher rates. In other instances,
however, this solution is not possible. One consumer may be willing
to put up with more telephone busy signals in exchange for lower
rates; another may be willing to pay a great deal to be able to put
his call through the first time. But unless the dissatisfied consumers
are prepared to pay for an entirely separate telephone plant to serve
them, they are forced to take the single level of service provided or
no service at all.
Economics can provide a solution for pieces of this problem but
not for the whole. If the production function for the appropriate
amount of service of various levels is known, one can by mathematical
techniques maximize the level of service from a given amount of
input, or minimize the amount of input necessary to produce a given
level of service. But here neither the level of service nor the amount
of input may be taken as given. An intuitive approximation of the
appropriate level of service might be obtained if the demand functions for various possible services were known, but, in the absence
of a practical means of testing consumer desires in an actual market,
the determination of demand functions is notoriously difficult. 07
Further, even if the commission could precisely quantify both the
production and demand functions, economic theory as yet cannot
give it any practical advice on how to determine the optimal costservice combination if there exists a genuine indivisibility, like the
telephone plant which can provide only one level of service. 08
Perhaps because of its difficulty most commissions simply ignore
the service problem and leave to the regulated company the job of
setting service standards within a broad framework. 00 In the few proceedings in which the matter is considered, the commissions rely on
essentially political mechanisms, such as consumer complaints or
counsel for consumer groups, to substitute for the market and pro•
vide a guide to consumer desires.70 While one might argue that
67. Market surveys can be used but are quite imprecise. See generally W. BAUMOL,
ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 210-49 (2d ed. 1965).
68. Intuitively, it would seem that the commission should choose the level whicl1
maximized consumer surplus, but that cltoice would be optimal only if the com•
mission could ignore allocational effects on the rest of the economy. The area strikes
me as one in need of further basic theoretical researclt.
69. See In re American Tel. 8: Tel. Co., 9 F.C.C.2d 30, 122, 70 P.U.R.3d 129, 223 (1907)
Gohnson, C., concurring), for a recognition of the problem. See also I A. KAHN, supra
note 6, at 21-25; Posner, supra note 20, at 593-94, in CRISIS, supra note 2, at 30, 33.
70. Thus, in the recent New York telephone "crisis," the Commission became pain•
fully aware of the problem through the political uproar that occurred in the press
over the deteriorating quality of service. Of course, this political mecltanism will re•
spond only to those who have political voice while the market mecltanism responds
io those with money. The two groups are not necessarily the same.
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economic data about cost and demand, though imperfect, should
also be used in such proceedings, the service standards area remains
one in which economists currently cannot claim exclusive competence.
Finally, it can be argued that regulation could be used to achieve
economic goals other than allocational efficiency. We may, so the
argument runs, be prepared to sacrifice efficiency in order to achieve
such goals as full employment, stability, flexibility, or a market structure which has more than an optimal number of firms to reduce the
political power of large firms. Conscious consideration of such objectives is very rare in regulatory proceedings, although recently a few
commissions, mixing micro- with macro-economic objectives, have
said they considered the inflationary effect of granting a rate increase. 71 Should the consideration of such nonallocational goals become common, economic learning would still be relevant both for
determining how much pursuit of the nonallocational goal was costing in efficiency terms and also because of the essentially economic
nature of the nonallocational goal.
Our examination of the four major areas in which goals of regulation other than the approximation of allocation efficiency have
been asserted reveals that we need not substantially qualify our initial
proposition that the approximation of allocational efficiency is the
sole goal of regulation. The historical goal of redistributive equity
and the possible nonallocational economic goals play a small role in
today's regulatory proceedings. The externalities problem illustrated
by the Storm King case and the service standards problem prove
upon examination to be areas in which allocational efficiency may
well be the appropriate goal, but the difficulties of obtaining information or the absence of a satisfactory theoretical solution make a
quasi-political type of proceeding desirable. Even in these cases,
however, economics is clearly relevant, and price and entry regulation cases do not normally involve such ambiguous evaluations.
Thus, one could have a regulatory system devoted almost solely to
traditional economic issues and manned almost entirely by economists with legal participation confined to the occasional case which
raised broader issues. We certainly have seen nothing so far which
justifies the legal domination of the field of price and entry regulation which we have today.
B.

Legal Issues in Regulation

Up to this point, our review has developed the prima facie case
for the withdrawal, or at least substantial retrenchment, of lawyers
from the regulatory scene. Let us see if anything can be said for the
legal profession by way of rebuttal.
71. See, e.g., 51
ion).

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

REP., Aug. 30, 1971, at 1-7 (examiner's opin-
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Legal dominance of the regulated industries field is largely the
product of historical accident. The first regulators were the legislatures and the courts, institutions in which lawyers traditionally play
a leading role. 72 Administrative regulation was born at a time when
there were substantial questions about its constitutionality. When
President Cleveland was looking for a chairman for the newly formed
ICC, he turned to the distinguished academic authority on constitutional law and Michigan Supreme Court Justice, Thomas Cooley. 73
When the newer federal regulatory agencies were formed in the
thirties, the prevailing profession in Washington was law. Today,
however, the courts have largely abandoned the attempt to develop
a substantive law of regulated industries as a subbranch of constitutional law,74 and Washington is now teeming with young economists
and other "quantitative" specialists who might be persuaded to go
into the fi.eld. 75
Administrative procedure is, of course, a legal field, and nothing
I have said here should be taken as arguing that economists would
be better at it than lawyers. The lawyer's sense for and interest in
process, however, may be responsible for diverting attention from the
pressing substantive problems of the commissions. For example, Dean
Landis' comprehensive review of the policies and practices of the
federal regulatory agencies for then President-elect K.ennedy70 marked
for many the beginning of a new concern with those agencies. Landis
found that the "fourth branch" of government, the bright hope of
the thirties, had become in the sixties a group of moribund agencies,
bound tightly in their procedural rules and making decisions which
were incomprehensible even to the participants. He cited the FPC's
regulation of natural gas field prices as "a classic example of the
breakdmvn of the administrative process." 77 Landis' report was heavily procedural in its recommendations, and many of these recommendations were followed-yet the problems remain. 78 Currently, the
Ash Council recommendations of replacing the commissions with a
single administrator, a rigid time frame for regulatory decisions, and
a specialized appeals court have stirred up a whole new round of
controversy about the organization and procedures of the agencies. 70
72. See W. JONES, supra note 56, at 26-43.
73. 4 I. SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 14 &: n.24 (1937).
74. See FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944); Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502 (1934).
75. Bickel, Lawyers b More Lawyers, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 23, 1967, at 24,
76. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS,, LANDIS REPORT ON THE
REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT (Comm. Print 1960).
'
77. Id. at 54.
78. See CrusIS, supra note 2, at vii-viii.
79. Compare ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXEC, ORG., A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORKREPORT oN SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES (1971), with Views of the Ad·
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Under the current lawyers'· dominance of the field, discussion of
these procedural issues will probably continue to divert attention
from the more pressing substantive problems discussed above. Indeed, it can be argued that the lawyer's procedural focus continually
diverts attention from the substance of regulatory issues. Lawyers
are trained to deal with courts; they tend to think about administrative law solely in terms of judicial review. On the other hand,
because the courts limit themselves, as a rule, to consideration of
procedural questions on agency appeals, procedural questions bulk
large in the lawyers' treatment of cases at the agency level. The resulting procedural orientation not only diverts attention from substance, but has peculiar and annoying substantive repercussions. For
example, the mishmash of numbers approach to rate of return, discussed earlier,80 is at least in part the product of the commissions'
desire to fortify their opinions against judicial review. 81
To say, moreover, that lawyers have something to contribute to
the shaping of administrative procedure is not to say that they necessarily should continue to dominate the practice. Anyone who has seen
a regulatory lawyer cross-examining an economic witness-returning
to the counsel table every other question to ask his economic witness
what he ought to ask next-must have wondered if the whole process
would not be better if the middleman were eliminated. Anyone who
has seen a faithful government lawyer who has risen to the position
of hearing examiner struggling over the meaning of "marginal
cost" must have wondered if legal training and experience were the
best preparation for the job. Even assuming that the basic outlines
of agency procedure are to remain unchanged, there is nothing so
mysterious about the conduct of an administrative proceeding, particularly under the relaxed rules of evidence which most agencies
follow, that a qualified economist could not be trained to undertake it. 82 If there is some valid reason for the domination of the
regulatory process by lawyers, it certainly does not lie in the fact
that the procedures of an administrative agency bear some vague resemblance to those of a court.
ministrative Conference of the United States on the "Report on Selected Independent
Regulatory Agencies" of the President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization
(mimeo May 7, 1971), and Welch, Pages with the Editor, 87 PUB. UTIL. FORT. March
18, 1971, at 4; id., April 15, 1971, at 4; id., June 24, 1971, at 4.
80. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
81. See Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for a Better
Definition of Standards, 75 HARV. L. REv. 863, 881; id. 1055, 1056, 1084-87; id. 1263,
1294-95 (1962), in THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 23, 54, 86-91, 142-43 (1962);
Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69 YALE
L.J. 931 (1960).
82. At least one administrative agency, the FCC, bas had a staff team of a lawyer
and an economist conduct part of an administrative proceeding. See 35 TELEC0MMUNlCATIONS REP., Sept. 15, i969, at 4-5.
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Of course the charters of the regulatory commissions are to be
found in statutes. These define and limit with some precision the
jurisdiction and powers of the commissions. Jurisdictional questions
are important and will continue to remain the concern of la'wyers,
although even here economics should play a role-a lesson taught
by the natural gas field price problem. So far as the commissions'
specific powers are concerned, however, they are usually so broad
that any sophisticated commission can normally achieve any result
it wishes by exercising authority given by one or the other of them.
Certainly in the areas of price and entry regulation the statutory
language, even with its accumulated judicial interpretation, gives the
commission enough latitude that no significant constraint is imposed
on its actions.83
The last argument I will mention for the lawyer's participation
in the regulatory process revolves around the public nature of the
proceedings. Under our system of government, it is argued, decisions that have the great impact that regulatory decisions can have
on both business and the consuming public are required to be made
on an open record and subject to judicial review. 84 In such a process
the lawyer's training as an advocate ensures that the arguments for
the interests he represents are best presented to the decision-maker
and makes him more effective than any economist could be. The
major premise of the argument needs some refinement. No one has
ever seriously suggested that the Federal Reserve Board conduct a
legal proceeding before changing the discount rate, an act which has
an economic impact greater than even the most major of rate and entry proceedings. Where, however, the Government issues an order or
makes a decision adjudicating a specific question involving a private
individual or firm, as it does in the typical price or entry case, adversary proceedings are normally required. We have seen that such
proceedings have not been particularly appropriate for developing
the statistical information that is critical to price and entry proceedings. Assuming, however, that major changes in the adversary nature
of the proceedings will not occur, is there anything, aside from the
absurd argument that only lawyers are ethical, about the advocate's
role which requires that the advocate be a lawyer?85 If the issues
83. See Posner, supra note 20, at 592-93, in Crusis, supra note 2, at 30-32.
84. See Cramton, supra note 62, at 185-86, in DIRECTIONS, supra note 6, at 255-56.
85. Lest I be accused of totally missing the boat, let me say that I am painfully
aware, of a substantial body of state cases which hold that only a lawyer can reprc•
sent another individual or a corporation in a regulatory proceeding. The universal
presence of the organized bar either as plaintiff-prosecutor or amicus in such cases can
only raise the suspicion that the most primitive guild instincts of the organized bar arc
at stake, and the weakness of the opinions does nothing to dispel those suspicions. Some
cases offer no rationale at all (e.g., Denver Bar Assn. v. Colorado Pub. Util. Commn.,
154 Colo. 273, 391 P.2d 467 (1964)); others rest on the naked assertion that commission
proceedings are "quasi-judicial" (e.g., Public Serv. Commn. v. Hahn Transp., Inc., 253
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at stake are purely economic, cannot the economist, given a small
amount of training, marshal and present the arguments as well as
or better than the lawyer?
IV.

CONCLUSION

I conclude, then, that (1) the goal of price and entry regulation is,
in the vast majority of cases, the economic one of efficient resource
allocation; (2) the technical tools for achieving this goal are chiefly
economists' tools; and (3) the legal profession has not done a good job
of achieving these goals or even of using these tools. These conclusions lead to a further conclusion: the end of legal dominance of
price and entry regulation in favor of economic dominance. That
does not mean that lawyers should be barred from regulatory proceedings or from serving on regulatory commissions. The possible
presence of a Storm King type of issue or of a complex procedural
or statutory issue makes that solution unwise. None of the justifications for occasional legal participation in regulatory" proceedings,
however, affect my basic conclusion that economists should play a
far greater role in the process than they do today.
What I have proposed, even as qualified above, is probably
utopian. The more economically oriented of the recent task force
reports on economic regulation suggested merely that one economist
be appointed to serve on each of the regulatory commissions and
even that recommendation does not seem to have been followed. 86
Yet the replacement of lawyers by economists in regulation is a goal
worth striving for not only because economists would probably do a
better job, but also because lawyers' training is being wasted in
doing it.
Md. 571, 253 A.2d 845 (1969)): and some rest on the proposition that only lawyers are
learned:
While, in order to acquire the education necessary to gain admission to the bar
and thereby become eligible to practice law, one is obliged to "scorn delights,
and live laborious days," the object of the legislation forbidding practice to laymen is not to secure to lawyers a monopoly, however deserved, but, by preventing
the intrusion of inexpert and unlearned persons in the practice of law, to assure to the public adequate protection in the pursuit of justice, than which society knows no loftier aim.
Shortz v. Farrell, 327 Pa. 81, 91, 193 A. 20, 24 (1937). See Chicago :Bar Assn. v. Kellogg,
338 Ill. App. 618, 88 N.E.2d 519 (1949); State ex rel. Johnson v. Childe, 147 Neb.·527, 23
N.W.2d 720 (1946). The situation at the federal level is considerably more open. Many
administrative agencies permit nonlawyers to practice before them. See Vom :Baur,
Administrative Agencies and Unauthorized Practice of Law, 48 A.B.A.J. 715 (1962);
Vom :Baur, Practice Before Administrative Agencies and the Unauthorized Practice of
Law, 15 FED. 13.J. 103 (1955). And the Supreme Court has held that the states may not
interfere on unauthorized practice grounds with the practice of those duly admitted before a federal agency. Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963), noted in 1964 WIS. L.
REV. 469. It seems relatively clear, therefore, that the only legal obstacle to my recommendation at the federal level is the rules of the agencies themselves. In many states,
however, my recommendation must be directed to the organized bar and the legislature.
86. See STIGLER TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 61, at 208.
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Viewing our role .as lawyers as broadly as possible, we are trained
to manipulate the stream of ideas of a society and to fit those ideas
to specific human facts. Despite the important contributions of psychology to family and criminal law and despite the importance of
medical or engineering evidence in tort law, we remain predominant
in these fields, because we can effectively fit the concepts of those
corollary disciplines into a stream of accumulated case law, statutes,
and general societal wisdom and apply the results to the ever-changing
human situations before us. But no such task is presented by price
and entry regulation. Accumulated societal wisdom reduces in this
field to one almost plaintive charge: achieve, as closely as possible,
an optimal resource allocation. Nor are the facts to be dealt with
the specific human ones of the tort, criminal, or family proceeding.
They are on a remoter plane; they are the trends and averages deduced from masses of numbers. With all the other areas in which
society needs legal skills, surely we can leave this one to those who
are trained for it.

